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political freedoms in the context
of conflicts like World War I,
World War II, the Vietnam War,
and the Cold War.8 Second, she
states her lengthy objections to
the USA PATRIOT Act and other
post-September 11 actions by
the United States government
in the name of national security.9
Finally, she concludes with a
brief chapter regarding how the
country can correct the alleged
attack on the civil rights of its
citizens.10 This article reviews the
author's main arguments against
the USA PATRIOT Act in Part I,
and offers commentary on those
arguments in Part II.
I. THE AUTHOR'S ARGUMENT
Silencing Political Dissent chal-
lenges the federal government's
response to the September 11
terrorist attacks with a three-
pronged argument against the
USA PATRIOT Act and various
actions of the executive branch.
First, it condemns the new pow-
ers of the executive branch under
the act as "undemocratic,"11 inva-
sive, and, in the case of its pow-
ers over noncitizens, a violation of
due process.12 Second, it attacks
the secrecy of the Bush adminis-
tration with regard to Immigration
and Naturalization Service
("INS")13 detentions and depor-
tations in a domestic "shadow
war." 1 4 Third, it suggests that the
Bush administration has acted
to quash dissenting opinions by
branding anyone holding those
opinions as unpatriotic.15 It touts
a strong judiciary as the solution,
encouraging members of that
branch not to "acquiesce in [the]
surrender" of the Bill of Rights.
1 6
A. How THE USA PATRIOT
ACT UNDERMINES OUR CIVIL
LIBERTIES
The author first alleges that the
USA PATRIOT Act undercuts the
liberties of Americans by jeopar-
dizing First Amendment1 7 speech
and association freedoms with
the new crime of "domestic
terrorism '"18 and discriminates
against noncitizens on an ideo-
logical basis.19 Her main concern
is the broad sweep of the defini-
tion of domestic terrorism, which
includes all activities that "appear
to be intended to . . . intimidate
or coerce a civilian population.
'20
She argues that such broad lan-
guage authorizes the government
to investigate many political orga-
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nizations that engage in "legiti-
mate political dissent, '21 citing
pro-environment, anti-globaliza-
tion, and anti-abortion groups
as potential domestic terrorists
under the USA PATRIOT Act.22
The Act also requires the INS to
deny entrance to persons from
"a political, social or other similar
group whose public endorsement
of acts of terrorist activity the
Secretary of State has determined
undermines United States efforts
to reduce or eliminate terrorist
activities.' '23 The author equates
this disparate treatment of for-
eigners under the USA PATRIOT
Act to the McCarran-Walter Act
of 1952,24 a Cold War-era statute
allowing the State Department to
exclude "aliens who are members
of or affiliated with the Communist
Party of the United States. '25
The author's second concern
with the Act is that it jeopardizes
privacy rights by granting the
executive branch excessive sur-
veillance and information shar-
ing powers;26 specifically, the
increased power to track Internet
activity,27 the power to conduct
"sneak-and-peek" searches,28
and the new limitations on the
Fourth Amendment's 29 require-
ment for probable cause. She is
again concerned with the breadth
of such powers. The Act allows
surveillance of "dialing, routing,
addressing and signaling infor-
mation, ' 31 and the author argues
that all Internet activity could fall
into one of these four catego-
ries.32 Thus, the Act essentially
allows for unlimited surveillance
of Internet activity.33 The author's
second and third apprehensions
concerning privacy are related
to the execution of searches. 4
Section 218 of the Act allows law
enforcement to bypass the prob-
able cause requirement if a "sig-
nificant purpose" of the search is
to gather foreign intelligence.
35
She argues that this erosion of
the probable cause requirement,
coupled with the authorization
of "sneak-and-peak" searches,
are contrary to the "knock and
announce" doctrine adopted by
the Supreme Court 36 and required
by the Fourth Amendment.
The author's third attack on the
USA PATRIOT Act is her argu-
ment that it serves to erode the
due process rights of noncitizens
because it broadens the class of
noncitizens subject to deporta-
tion and expands the class of
noncitizens subject to detention.38
Section 411 of the Act broadens
the definition of "terrorist activity"
to include crimes that involve a
''weapon or dangerous device
(other than for mere monetary or
personal gain). '39 It also prohibits
the material support of a terrorist
organization, 40 even when that
organization has other legitimate
means.41 The author points out
that a noncitizen using a knife
in a heat of passion crime could
be deported under section 41 1,42
and someone donating money to
a designated terrorist organiza-
tion, yet earmarking it solely for
humanitarian assistance, could
be guilty of engaging in terrorist
activity.43
B. EDGING TOWARD GOVERNMENT
BY EXECUTIVE FIAT
Though the USA PATRIOT
Act increased the powers of
the executive tremendously, the
author alleges that the Bush
administration is even abusing
those heightened powers by
exercising preventative deten-
tions,44 abusing detainees,45
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and monitoring attorney-client
conversations,46 all under a veil
of secrecy.47 She questions the
detentions of the Bush adminis-
tration, as well as the living con-
ditions of those being detained.48
She cites Georgetown law pro-
fessor David Cole's estimate of
approximately 2000 domestic
detainees by April 2002, 49 as well
as various allegations of physical
and mental abuse of detainees by
prison guards. 0
The author is particu-
larly enraged with the recent
Department of Justice regula-
tion permitting the monitoring of
attorney-client conversations of
federal inmates without notice
when "reasonable suspicion
exists to believe that a particular
inmate may use communications
with attorneys or their agents to
further or facilitate acts of terror-
ism."5 1 She contends that such
surveillance cuts to the core of
the criminal defendant's rights
secured by the Constitution
because it "is designed to chill,
if not freeze, the confidential dis-
cussions between an inmate and
his attorney that are essential to a
well-prepared defense.
52
Perhaps the greatest point of
fear for the author is the secrecy
with which the United States
government acts in the post-
September 11 world. The govern-
ment has often kept the names of
federal detainees a secret, pro-
hibited them from communicat-
ing with the outside world, and
barred the public and the press
from immigration hearings. 53 She
accuses the Bush administra-
tion of erecting a wall of secrecy
around the detainees to hide the
fact that they were detained only
on the basis of a racial or ethnic
profile and without a link to ter-
rorism. 4 Additionally, the lack of
public access to even a list of
detainees, let alone communica-
tion with them, effectively strips
those detainees of their rights to
an attorney.
55
C. SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT
The author's final group of
assaults on the federal govern-
ment centers on the Bush admin-
istration's efforts to demonize
dissenters, labeling them un-
American or unpatriotic.56 She
claims that since September 11,
the Bush administration has been
so fearful of dissent that it takes
any opportunity to undermine and
criticize it, as well as attempting
to police thought by investigat-
ing law-abiding Americans who
hold controversial viewpoints. 7
Angered that administration offi-
2003
cials such as Attorney General
John Ashcroft "refus[e] to rec-
ognize the distinction between
core political speech ... and the
crime of treason,"5 8 Chang fears
that political speech, coupled
with any protest or civil disobedi-
ence, could now lead to charges
of domestic terrorism.59 She con-
cludes that the increased powers
of the administration, along with
the increased secrecy in which it
acts, "threaten the vitality of our
democracy."60
D. RECLAIMING OUR CIVIL
LIBERTIES
After a 134-page tirade against
in every person. As the author
suggests, Americans must be
proactive in protecting our civil
liberties. We cannot allow a return
to the xenophobia of the past,
and we must be vigilant to avoid
plunging into a "cycle of restrict-
ed freedom '6 4 in which Arabs are
forced to live through an experi-
ence mirroring the Japanese
internment experience of World
War II. Openness of government
and the freedom of the press are
fundamental requirements for
democracy because they allow
Americans to hold their govern-
ment accountable for its actions
two fatal flaws. First, the author
seems to envision a world in
which terrorist organizations
are transparent and publish
audited financial statements.
In reality, we have no way to
ensure money earmarked for
humanitarian ends will ultimately
be utilized for such purposes.
Many terrorist organizations
operate and raise funds under a
veil of charity.66 Second, when a
terrorist organization offers aid
to a community, common sense
allows the deduction that the
community becomes less likely to
bite the hand that literally feeds it,
The Colorado Constitution prohibits nuclear detonation in the state.
COLO. CONST. aft. XXVI.
the USA PATRIOT Act and the
Bush Administration, the author
concludes her book with a four
paragraph solution on reclaiming
our civil liberties.61 She encour-
ages Americans to protest mea-
sures that infringe on their liberty
by organizing, educating, and
reaching out to people.62 She
calls on the courts to be vigi-
lant in upholding the freedoms
granted by the Bill of Rights, and
she closes by arguing that "our
future safety lies in the expansion,
rather than the contraction, of the




raises many compelling concerns
about protecting our liberties and
the general human rights inherent
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and call for change in the case
of abuse. However, there are
two specific areas-support for
terrorist organizations and the
sharing of intelligence between
government agencies-where
I respectfully disagree with the
author. The changes in these
areas since September 11 have
helped and will continue to help
in preventing terrorist attacks.
A. SUPPORTING TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS
The author argues that
Americans should be concerned
that the definition of "engage in
terrorist activity" would include a
monetary donation to a terrorist
organization with humanitarian
ends when the donor earmarks
the donation only for those lawful
ends.65 Her argument contains
i.e., less likely to rise up against
the violence and terror that the
organization perpetuates. Thus,
even assuming that a humanitarian
donation ultimately reaches those
lawful ends, it indirectly supports
a terrorist organization's violent
ends.
An examination of the notorious
Middle-Eastern terrorist group
Hamas illustrates why the afore-
mentioned donations must be
outlawed.67 The Hamas military
wing has claimed responsibility
for many acts of terrorism, includ-
ing many suicide attacks on Israeli
civilians.68 Under the same name,
the group also builds schools
and hospitals in the Palestinian
controlled areas of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.6 9 Though the
humanitarian ends that Hamas
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supports are aimed at helping
the Palestinian people survive
and thrive, those legitimate and
moral ends also bolster its repu-
tation and support, thus indirectly
furthering its violence. Other
Palestinian charities, such as The
United Palestinian Appeal,70 pro-
vide a less destructive alternative,
supporting Palestinian civilians
without the murder and terror of
Hamas. The USA PATRIOT Act
correctly equates a donation to
Hamas as engaging in terrorist
activity, regardless of the condi-
tions placed on that donation.
The failure of the author's argu-
ment is in her unrealistic vision of
a transparent terrorist organiza-
tion and in ignoring the indirect




In discussing her objections
to preventative detention, noted
supra,7 ' the author questions
whether the detention policies of
the Bush administration will have
any effect on terrorism.72 Yet later,
when she voices her objections
to information sharing among
government agencies, notably
absent from her commentary 73
is the fact that many blame the
lack of this very information shar-
ing for the intelligence failures of
September 11 and point to infor-
mation sharing as an essential
element in the prevention of future
terrorist attacks.74 Though the
author's main argument relates to
sharing of grand jury information,
she also raises a more general
concern about sharing among
government agencies.75
In her argument against intel-
ligence sharing, the author cites
the now infamous report by the
Church Committee in 1976,76
revealing CIA and FBI files on,
among others, anti-Vietnam
War protesters and civil rights
leaders.77 However, the author's
reliance on this example is mis-
placed. In the instance of a repeat
of the Church Committee, loosen-
ing of intelligence sharing would
not materially alter the scenario.
The Church Committee's injustice
was that the files existed in the first
place, not that they were shared
between government agencies. It
is an example of a disturbing gov-
ernment abuse of power rather
than a flaw in how agencies share
information obtained using lawful
powers. New information sharing
laws do not make such abuses
more or less probable. In the end,
the author's broader argument
against the sharing of informa-
tion is unconvincing. As the key
weapon in fighting terrorism,78
"working-level '79 cooperation will
aid law enforcement agencies in
preventing future attacks.
CONCLUSION
On September 11, 2001, the
United States was not only
violently thrust into another
crossroads in our own history,
but the history of the world as a
whole. Silencing Political Dissent
provides a thorough and well-
organized argument against the
federal government's reaction
to the events of that day. Nancy
Chang points out many potential
dangers of the USA PATRIOT Act,
and she looks to the judiciary
to hold other branches of
government to the limits imposed
on them by the Constitution.
All Americans should share the
author's concern with the threat
to our civil rights and the human
rights abuses relating to federal
detainees.
Unfortunately, the USA PATRIOT
Act swings the pendulum too far
towards a police state, and away
from a free society. However,
while protecting and reclaiming
our civil liberties, it is in our
interest to support key provisions
of the Act that protect citizens
without materially sacrificing
liberty. We must cut off all funding
to terrorist organizations and
share intelligence among all law
enforcement agencies. In doing
so, America has no small task. We
must compile lessons from Cold
War and World War II xenophobia,
as well as the policy and
intelligence failures of September
11, in order to both protect our
citizens and concurrently protect
the values and ideals of this great
nation.
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